
Gladstone’s line still holds: liberalism is trust of the people tempered by prudence. The current discussion of a staggered age of consent tests that directly. It is less a debate about the exact age at which sex becomes lawful and more a debate about when the state recognises someone as capable of making decisions and accepting responsibility for them.
I would keep a single age of consent—at 17—and resist making that capacity conditional on the age of the other person. Once the threshold is crossed, the presumption should be that the individual can consent. Any further restriction needs a clear justification. A staggered rule treats the age-of-consent law as a convenient proxy for problems that already have, or should have, their own legal home.
Keep the three functions separate
Three different questions are in play. They should not be collapsed into one another.
First, non-consensual sex—rape and sexual assault. These offences already exist and turn on whether consent was present. Age can be relevant evidence. It is not the offence itself. If the worry is that consent was not real, the right place to look is the existing law of sexual offences.
Second, abuse of trust or position. Someone in a position of authority, dependency or control can exploit that position. The law already recognises certain positions of trust with 16- and 17-year-olds. Where those provisions are too narrow, they can be tightened. The limit is straightforward: the definitions have to stay clear. An offence that rests on vague ideas of “imbalance” or “exploitation” hands too much discretion to prosecutors and courts. Protection against private power should not create arbitrary public power.
If exploitation is hard to prove in practice, the proper response is to clarify the abuse-of-trust offence, not to rewrite the age-of-consent rule so that an age gap itself becomes the crime. Difficulty of prosecution is not the same thing as the absence of an offence. And consensual sex that someone later regrets is not, by itself, a criminal matter.
Third, the age of consent proper. Its job is to mark the point at which the state recognises general capacity. It is not a residual bucket for every concern the other two offences do not catch. Once that recognition is given, either the person is treated as capable or they are not. A rule that says you may consent with some adults but not others needs a justification that goes beyond the desire for a bright protective line.
What a staggered rule still has to explain
Those who want to stagger capacity by the partner’s age have to answer a few awkward questions.
If an age gap is a good enough proxy for exploitation that it should criminalise otherwise consensual sex, why do we not treat other legal capacities the same way? We do not make the right to vote, marry or give medical consent depend on the age of someone else. A staggered sexual rule treats sex as uniquely different. That difference has to be spelled out.
What exactly is the wrong? If it is lack of consent, we already have offences for that. If it is abuse of a position of trust, we can strengthen that offence—provided we keep the language precise. If it is neither, then the staggered rule is creating a new crime whose substance is simply the age difference. That needs its own defence, and it has to explain why later regret does not become the test.
Why put the proxy in the capacity rule rather than fix the abuse-of-trust provisions? Evidentiary difficulty is a reason to improve the offence that targets the abuse, not a reason to change what counts as capacity.
Prudence still applies
Evidence of harm can properly influence where we set the single age. Patterns of violence or particular risks might justify a higher threshold than we would otherwise choose. They do not justify making capacity itself depend on who the partner is. Trust tempered by prudence means looking at what the existing law already does, keeping the categories distinct, and thinking about how any new power will be used later. Protective aims do not excuse vague drafting or the habit of using one offence to solve the problems of another.
The burden sits with those who want the staggered rule. They need to show why an age difference should stand in for proof of non-consent or abuse of trust, and why sexual capacity should be conditional when other adult capacities are not. It is not for everyone else to prove that every relationship above a single age is harmless.
Liberalism should prefer clear rules, limited discretion and a presumption of trust in the individual. A single age of consent, with abuse of trust addressed in its own properly defined offence, fits that approach better than a rule which makes legal capacity turn on the age of the other person. Trust of the people, tempered by prudence, remains the more reliable guide.
* Owen Driscoll is a member of Epping and Harlow Liberal Democrats.